MAGALLÁNICA, Revista de Historia Moderna: 12 / 23 (Dossier)
Julio - Diciembre de 2025, ISSN 2422-779X

THE ENGLISH RESPONSE TO THE ACCESSION OF PHILIP V IN SPAIN, C. 1697-1713/20

Christopher Storrs
University of St Andrews, United Kingdom

Recibido: 21/08/2025
Aceptado: 22/08/2025

ABSTRACT

He situates the English response to Philip's ascension, in part, in the context of a specific domestic policy. He also cautions against the need to consider English concerns in 1700 solely in light of the trade concessions by which it emerged victorious from the war in a separate peace in 1713, at which time it was also bound in a more formal union than before with the kingdom of Scotland. In the last years of William III (d. 1702), the English response was largely in tune with that of the Dutch republic to Philip's ascension – and yields important data on it – but by 1713 William's death and, above all, the war – had significantly, though not completely, divided England and the Dutch

KEYWORDS: William III; England; Scotland; Whigs; Tories; Jacobitism; Dutch; asiento.

LA RESPUESTA INGLESA A LA ASCENSIÓN DE FELIPE V EN ESPAÑA, C. 1697-1713/20

RESUMEN

Situa la respuesta inglesa a la ascensión de Felipe, en parte en el contexto de una política interna específica. También advierte contra la necesidad de considerar las preocupaciones inglesas en 1700 únicamente a la luz de las concesiones comerciales con las que salió victoriosa de la guerra en una paz separada en 1713, momento en el que también estaba vinculada en una unión más formal que antes con el reino de Escocia. En los últimos años de Guillermo III (m. 1702), la respuesta inglesa estuvo en gran medida en sintonía con la de la República Holandesa frente a la ascensión de Felipe -y arroja importantes datos sobre ella-, pero para 1713 la muerte de Guillermo y, -sobre todo la guerra- había dividido significativamente, aunque no completamente, a Inglaterra y los holandeses.

PALABRAS CLAVE: Guillermo III; Inglaterra; Escocia; whigs; tories; jacobitismo; Holanda; asiento.

Christopher Storrs. Christopher Storrs studied Modern History at the university of Oxford before completing his PhD at the university of London (LSE). Between 1994 and 2022 he taught at the university of Dundee. He is currently honorary Professor of History at the university of St Andrews, Scotland. He has published widely in the history of early modern Europe, on Italy, Spain and its empire, state formation, diplomacy and war. His chief publications are War, Diplomacy and the Rise of Savoy 1690-1720 (1999), The Resilience of the Spanish Monarchy, 1665-1700 (2006), The Spanish Resurgence 1713-1748 (2016), and the edited collection, The Fiscal-Military State in Eighteenth-Century Europe (2009). He is currently preparing a history of espionage and intelligence in Europe between 1500 and 1800.
Correo electrónico: cs423@st-andrews.ac.uk
ID ORCID: 0000-0001-9628-9512

THE ENGLISH RESPONSE TO THE ACCESSION OF PHILIP V IN SPAIN, C. 1697-1713/20

> "…when the busie Mercurial Temper of the French puts a new Life into the Movements of Spain, these two Nations will carry all before them…" (*HISPANIA ILLUSTRATA*, 1703)

Introduction

The War of the Spanish Succession, the "great war" of the first half of the eighteenth century, shaped the short- and longer-term development of England - Great Britain following union with Scotland (1707) - as a major power in Europe, just as it shaped the short- and longer-term development of Spain, and of the broader European order. This essay seeks to explain why England was so concerned about the Spanish Succession, why the accession of Philip V in 1700 propelled England into war against Spain in 1702, why what began as a war of partition of the Spanish Monarchy soon became for England one to secure the entire Monarchy for Philip's rival, the Austrian Habsburg archduke Charles, an objective encapsulated in the phrase "No Peace Without Spain", only for English ministers to abandon that war aim such that the peace of 1713 effected a partition which left Philip in possession of Spain and the Indies (but no more), in a European order very different from 1700. The developing English mindset, between 1697/ 1700 and 1713 provides invaluable material for all who are interested in the causes or origins of wars, why, how - and when - they begin and end.

Louis XIV and many of those around him, not surprisingly, blamed his foreign enemies, not least William III of England (William of Orange) for forcing war on him, seeing Willam as a warmonger (THOMSON, 1954: 121-22, 131), whereas William believed that it was the French Court which was bent on war (GRIMBLOT, 1848: 1, 211). William shared a widely held view – inside and outside England before and after the death of Charles II - that war over Spain was likely, even inevitable (GRIMBLOT, 1848: 1, 360-63). However - and despite the view of at least one historian (ROOSEN, 1987) - war was not inevitable, systemic or structural, few wars are; it took more than a year after Philip's accession for England to declare war, which was declared not by

William but by his successor, queen Anne, although England's ally, Emperor Leopold, was already fighting the Bourbons in Italy and offensive operations against France and Spain were being prepared in England.

In exploring what drove English policy, it will become evident that, as in all other combatant states during the war of succession, there were various, often competing influences and interests at play in an already divided England. In February 1709 Louis XIV asserted that the war was primarily about trade with the Indies (HANOTIN, 2018: 86) This view contains some truth, but does not identify all that motivated the English/ British in 1709 (or in 1702 or in 1713), nor does it explain what motivated the Austrian Habsburgs (AUER, 2018: 431-43). There were many other issues at stake for the English, not least the fear of the imposition of a new European order in which a Bourbon bloc overturned the balance of power, with all that followed from that. In exploring these issues, I will focus on England (with little said about Scotland), not least because the war effort deployed mainly English resources, English concerns determined the key decisions, and those decisions were made by English politicians. For much of this period there were two rival English Courts, that in London and that in exile in France, what follows centres on the former. Events after 1713 will be discussed, but the emphasis is on the period 1697-1713.

England and Spain c. 1660-1700

A proper understanding of the English response to Philp V's accession in 1700 requires an appreciation of Anglo-Spanish relations in the preceding generation. Relations between England and Spain had not always been good. The abortive Spanish invasion of England – the Armada – of 1588 triggered a deep and enduring hostility and suspicion of Spain in England, founded on fear of a powerful, absolutist catholic Spain in possession of the Low Countries across the Channel. At the same time, there was an embedded memory of the exploits of sir Francis Drake and others, and of the riches (notably American silver) to be won in war against Spain. English anxieties and ambitions respecting Spain persisted well into the seventeenth century. As recently as the 1650s Cromwell's anti-Spanish "Western Design" had achieved the conquest of Jamaica (SANZ CAMANES, 2021: 2073-92), while as recently as the 1660s England had aided Portugal in its war of restoration against Spain.

Between 1660 and 1700, however, England and Spain were generally on good terms – and were even allies – following the emergence of an aggressive, absolutist, catholic France under Louis XIV, now perceived in England as more of a threat – to its liberty, security and trade - than was an apparently declining Spain; Louis' ambitions on Spanish Flanders make clear that in assessing English attitudes to Philip V we need to bear in mind that in 1700 Spain - the global Spanish Monarchy - comprised far more than just Spain.

The Spanish Court sought to mobilise English intervention on Spain's behalf, interfering in English politics to force a change of policy if necessary (STRADLING, 1972: 269-86). In 1667-68, England did intervene, with the Dutch republic and Sweden, to prevent Louis XIV's conquest of Spanish Flanders, and during Louis XIV's "Dutch War (1672-78), the Spanish Court effectively obliged Charles II of England to abandon his alliance with France. Subsequently, during the so-called War of the League of Augsburg, or Nine Years War (1688-97), England, ruled by William III and Mary following the "Glorious Revolution" of 1688, and Spain were both members of the Grand Alliance against France, Louis XIV supporting the exiled James II and his Jacobite supporters and refusing to acknowledge William and Mary as rightful sovereigns (THOMSON, 1961: 37-58; SZECHI, 2019: 73-6). In 1694-95 an English fleet wintered at Cadiz, helping to defend Catalonia in 1695 (EHRMAN, 1947-49: 269-92). During that conflict, William and his English ministers came to appreciate the value for England's Mediterranean interests of not only Cadiz but also of Gibraltar, Menorca, Ceuta and Oran. The success of the Grand Alliance obliged Louis XIV to return some of his earlier Spanish conquests, and to recognise William as king of England (Mary having died in 1694).

Spanish policy-makers then and later believed – with some justification - that English policy makers were particularly sensitive to threats to the country's trade in and with Spain, and that the English merchant community was very influential in Parliament. English trade in Spain in 1700 rested on a commercial treaty of 1667, which guaranteed English trading privileges in "Old" Spain and beyond in the wider Monarchy (MCLACHLAN, 1934: 299-311; MCLACHLAN, 1940: 14, 20-22; STEIN AND STEIN, 2000: 60-64). Another treaty, of 1670, acknowledged the English presence in the Caribbean, in Jamaica (FERNÁNDEZ NADAL, 2009: 15-40) English

merchants could not legally trade with "New" Spain – they, like all foreign merchants were still excluded from trading directly with Spanish America - but could trade there illegally, via Jamaica and Cadiz (MCLACHLAN, 1940: 37). The end of the Nine Years War in 1697, and with it the threat to commerce posed by French privateers, stimulated the resumption in volume of trade between Spain and England (MAHAFFY, 1916: 299-303). English commercial interests within the Monarchy extended beyond the peninsula to the Canaries (STECKLEY, 1980: 335-50) and to Flanders (MAHAFFY, 1916: 64). These commercial links were articulated by a network of English consuls in Spain's major ports, and contributed to the existence of a small English resident community (and occasional visitors) in Spain and its territories (CARRASCO GONZÁLEZ, 1997: 331-42) and to the presence of a small Spanish merchant community centred in London. An English community in Spanish Flanders included Jacobite exiles (MAHAFFY, 1916: 73-6).

Relations between England and Spain were better, but tensions persisted. English ministers expressed irritation that despite Spain's apparent decline in power, Spanish policy makers too often assumed the superiority of manner adopted by their ancestors in the reigns of Charles V (Charles I) and Philip II (STORRS, 1997: 374). When Charles II died in 1700, William III had no English minister in Madrid, the Spanish Court having expelled his English envoy, Alexander Stanhope at the end of 1699, such that English interests were overseen thereafter by William's Dutch representative in Madrid, Francis Schonenberg (FRANCIS, 1966: 88). As for the English merchant community in Spain, it sometimes encountered difficulties: in the spring of 1700 the local Inquisition arrested the English consul in the Canaries (BATESON, 1937b: 10). But England's trade with Spain was too advantageous to forfeit (MCLACHLAN, 1940), while England was ruled by a monarch, who valued Spain's contribution to the fight against the threat which William had long believed Louis XIV posed to the balance of power in Europe - and to his own position in England. A reluctance to alienate Spain, and the priority given to English concerns in London, helps explain why William failed to back his Scottish subjects when they sought to establish an independent colony at Darien in Spanish central America (STORRS, 1999: 5-37). The Spanish succession clearly mattered greatly, for various reasons, to many in England (and Scotland) in 1700.

Partition Treaties 1697-1700

While an appreciation of earlier Anglo-Spanish relations is necessary to understand English responses to the accession of Philip V, so too is a discussion of the two partition treaties concluded between William III, Louis XIV and the Dutch republic between 1698 and 1700.[1]

Charles II's failure, after two marriages, to secure the Spanish succession was matter for concern in England, as elsewhere in Europe. So, too, was the fact that Louis XIV regarded as invalid his wife's renunciation of her claim to that succession on the occasion of their marriage in 1659. To many in Europe a war seemed likely – even inevitable - over the Spanish succession, one between Louis, on behalf of his son, the dauphin and one of the dauphin's sons (not necessarily Philip of Anjou) and the Austrian Habsburg Emperor Leopold and his two sons. William III's ambassador in Paris in the spring of 1698, the Dutch earl of Portland, said as much to the French ministers, Pomponne and Torcy at the start of the partition negotiations (GRIMBLOT, 1848: 1, 290-94). However, another war so soon after the Nine Years War was not an attractive proposition to William and most of his English subjects. The "Glorious Revolution" (1688) transformed England/ Britain, not only confirming that it was a parliamentary monarchy but also launching it on its career as a European (and global) power. The two developments were closely related, the cost of the war in the 1690s making William dependent on parliamentary taxation, to underpin a growing national or public debt, England exemplifying what has been termed a "fiscal-military state" (WESTERN, 1972, 381-400; BREWER, 1989). However, while England's transition to the status of major power was successful in the long term from 1689, the war had been very challenging: in 1696 England had experienced a serious financial crisis which had threatened its capacity to fight on. The challenge of war on the new scale had fuelled the clash between Whigs and Tories inside and outside Parliament, a conflict which embraced all aspects of policy, strategy, and the funding of the war (HOLMES and SPECK, 1967). In 1697-98, following the end of the war, Parliament obliged William to reduce his army, limiting his ability to confront Louis XIV should the latter fight for the Spanish Monarchy when Charles II died (SCHWOERER, 1966: 74-94).

[1] Luis Ribot considers an earlier agreement between Louis XIV and Emperor Lepold, concluded in 1668, as the first partition treaty.

But William, who had led the resistance to Louis XIV in the last quarter of a century, could not ignore English concerns regarding the Spanish succession. In May 1698, Louis's ambassador in London, count Tallard, reported that although England was exhausted (after the war) and would be reluctant to get in volved in a new war, William's subjects "consider the partition of the succession of Spain as something in which they must take a part. Everybody spoke of it in the same manner …..that their commerce and its interests….would be ruined if your Majesty were in possession of the Indies and Cadiz" (GRIMBLOT, 1848: 1, 500-09). William's thinking and conduct were also fundamentally influenced by his concern for Dutch interests (STORRS, 2016a: 218), Louis valuing a deal with William not least because he also spoke for the Dutch (Thomson, 1954) and had influence over many of the German princes, such that the Emperor might find it difficult to oppose any agreement between Louis and William (GRIMBLOT, 1848: 1, 379-83). William responded positively to the initial French approach to Portland in March 1698, when the French ministers emphasised the threat to the balance of power if the Spanish Monarchy passed to the Austrian Habsburgs (as envisaged in the Grand Alliance of 1689) and proposed instead a peaceful, negotiated resolution of the Spanish succession issue, including guarantees that Spain should never fall under the dominion of the king of France. The episode is interesting also in that Portland made a point which would be a leitmotiv throughout in the years to come: Spain was feeble, having no navy, such that if it passed to the Austrian Habsburgs who also lacked a navy, it would be a long time before Spanish naval power revived, offering no threat to the English (or Dutch), whereas a Spain associated with France and its naval power would be a menace (GRIMBLOT, 1848: 1, 290-94). William, who rarely took into his confidence his English ministers (not least because they were less experienced than him on European affairs), and to ensure secrecy, consulted his closest Dutch collaborator, the Grand Pensionary Anthony Heinsius; to Portland he declared his wish to avoid another war before he died (GRIMBLOT, 1848: 1, 305-87), implicitly contradicting those French suggestions that he was a warmonger.

In responding to the French approach William sought to protect English (and Dutch) commercial and strategic interests in both the Mediterranean and the Indies against the threat of a massive Bourbon in which the Spanish Monarchy was effectively subordinate to France former), with French naval power enabling the Spaniards to

exclude the English (and Dutch) from their lucrative trade with Spain and its overseas territories. Initially Portland had vaguely suggested the cession of the (Spanish) West Indies to England (GRIMBLOT, 1848, 1, 294-304), but this was not pursued, although William did wonder if a partition of the West Indies was possible, as well as a larger barrier (for the Dutch) in Spanish Flanders and - reflecting the damage done to English shipping by privateers based at Dunkirk in the Nine Years War- the cession of Dunkirk (GRIMBLOT, 1848, 1, 294-304). In April 1698, pressed by Tallard on what port (in the Indies) might secure their Indies trade, William mentioned Havana in Cuba (GRIMBLOT, 1848: 1, 419-29). Initially, Louis XIV thought these demands absurd, since neither the English nor the Dutch had any legal (dynastic) claims on the Spanish succession, justifying compensation but he preferred to accommodate them in respect of one or more of Santo Domingo, Mahon (Menorca), Gibraltar, Ceuta and Oran in order to secure their agreement to the succession in Spain of one of his grandsons (GRIMBLOT, 1848: 1, 384-93).

In the event, these concessions proved unnecessary as a partition of the Spanish Monarchy was agreed to the advantage of the young electoral prince of Bavaria, Joseph Ferdinand, son of the Elector Max Emanuel and grandson of Emperor Leopold, thus an Austrian Habsburg). The prince's name had been suggested by Portland in March 1698 and was promptly taken up by king William (GRIMBLOT, 1848: 1, 456-64). This was the basis of the (first) partition treaty concluded at the Hague in October 1698 The electoral prince (who at the same time was designated his heir independently by Charles II in a separate will) would receive Spain, the Indies, Flanders and Sardinia, the dauphin would receive Naples, Sicily Guipuzcoa, Finale and the Tuscan presidios, while Leopold's younger son, the archduke Charles would receive Milan (GRIMBLOT, 1848: 2, 483-95). William had sought to prevent the accession in Spain of a grandson of Louis XIV with a candidate who proved a popular choice in England, witness the English delight at Charles II's designating the young prince as his heir. The treaty safeguarded English interests and maintained the peace (BATESON, 1937a: vii-viii). All parties appeared satisfied, including the Emperor (HOCHEDLINGER, 2003: 174-75), and further territorial or other concessions to England (and the Dutch) as sought earlier by Portland and William now seemed unnecessary.

Unfortunately, the death of the electoral prince in February 1699 rendered necessary further negotiations, which culminated in the second partition treaty (March 1700). Spain, the Indies and Flanders, would now pass to the archduke Charles on the death of Charles II, and Milan to the duke of Lorraine, whose duchy would pass to the dauphin, along with what was assigned the latter in the first partition treaty (GRIMBLOT, 1848: 2, 495-507). William III had again sought to prevent a French Bourbon securing the Spanish monarchy, but once again without the promise of any territorial concessions in the Mediterranean or the Indies. In September 1699 Charles Davenant informed a friend that he had heard that England was to get the Canaries on the death of the Spanish king, but he was clearly ill-informed (HISTORICAL MANUSCRIPTS COMMISSION, 1888: 2, 391-92). It is noteworthy that William had not considered the claim on the Spanish succession of the duke of Savoy, Victor Amadeus, although his claim - as a descendant of Philip II's younger daughter, Catalina – was recognised in the will of Philip IV. William's refusal to consider the claim – raised by Tallard as early as May 1698 - was due, in part at least, to the duke's desertion of the Grand Alliance in 1696, when he concluded a separate peace with Louis XIV (STORRS, 2016a: 227-54).

Although William had sought to secure English interests, reaction in England to the second Partition Treaty was mixed, once its provisions were known. Some were dismayed at the promised French acquisitions in the Mediterranean, believing that Naples and/or Sicily in French hands would threaten England's Levant trade,[2] a view which continued to influence thinking in England well into the War of the Spanish Succession (SNYDER, 1975: 2, 663-66). The clash of opinions in England was reflected in the usual pamphlet war.[3]

The Emperor insisted on securing for his son the entire Monarchy and refused to agree to partition, but it was hoped that others might be more positive such that securing adhesion to the partition treaty was one of the major objectives of English (and French and Dutch) diplomacy for the remainder of 1700.[4] Securing adhesion might involve some tweaking of the partition arrangements. Following approaches by the Duke of

[2] Archivio di Stato, Turin [AST], Lettere Ministri [LM], Inghilterra o Gran Bretagna, mazzo. 8b, count Maffei to duke of Savoy, London, 4 Nov. 1700.
[3] AST, LM, Inghilterra o Gran Bretagna, m. 8b, count Maffei to duke of Savoy, London, 11 Nov. 1700.
[4] AST, Negoziazioni, Spagna, mazzo 6, doc. 8: Memoria presented by the English ambassador in Switzerland urging the Swiss to join in the guarantee, 1700.

Savoy, resentful of his exclusion from the partition and desiring to secure the neighbouring duchy of Milan, it was suggested that the duke of Lorraine should receive Naples and Sicily instead of Milan, which should go to the Duke of Savoy, who in return would cede some of his territories to France. This project gradually turned into another: that the Duke of Savoy exchange his territories for Naples and Sicily. This scheme attracted William as a means of reassuring his English subjects (and the Dutch) regarding their trade in the Mediterranean, but the Duke of Savoy continued to prefer the Milanese, such that these proposals had made little progress by the time of Charles II's death (SYMCOX, 1983: 136-38). Very few other states had signed up to the Partition Treaty by that time (BATESON, 1937b: 118-20).

While William and Louis sought to secure support for the Partition Treaty, William and his English subjects also had to grapple with the issue of the English Succession. James II's residence in France after 1697 was resented by William III, and menaced the Partition Treaty negotiations (GRIMBLOT, 1848: 1, 370, 500-09). Furthermore, William and Mary, like Charles II, had no children of their own. As for their successor, Mary's sister, Anne, she had numerous children, but in the summer of 1700 the only one to have survived infancy, the duke of Gloucester died, posing the question who would succeed Anne, given the ineligibility of her half-brother, James II's son, James Edward Stuart, the "Old Pretender". Between the summer of 1700 and the passage of the Act of Settlement in the summer of 1701 - settling the succession on the Protestant house of Hanover and imposing certain limits on the power of the future monarch - who was to succeed in England focused minds there as much as did the Spanish Succession (TREVELYAN, 1930: 128-31; HORWITZ, 1977: 276-304).

Road To War December 1700- May 1702

The death of Charles II (1 November 1700), the revelation and publication of his will, Louis XIV's acceptance of the will on behalf of Philip of Anjou (rather than the younger duke of Berry) and Philip's proclamation as king of Spain at Versailles on 16 November created an entirely new situation. Within little more than two weeks of Charles II's death Louis had set aside the Partition Treaty which William had negotiated over more than two years, and threatened to bring about what that treaty had sought to prevent, the junction of Burbon France and Spain, with all that followed from it in terms

of a threat to English interests and the European balance. Significantly, linking the Spanish and English succession issues, the day after Philip's proclamation, the exiled James II waited on the new king; the Jacobite Court clearly anticipated an improvement in its own prospects with Philip's elevation (GRIMBLOT, 1848: 2, 479-81). William must now – like so many others in Europe - consider how to respond. Should he recognise Philip as king of Spain? And what else should be done? War was an option, was widely expected in the winter of 1700-1, and was eventually declared. But war was not inevitable and was not formally declared by England – by William's successor, queen Anne - for almost a year and a half (THOMSON, 1954: 111).

William learnt of the death of Charles II, and of his will on 12 November (KRAMER, 1909, 226-27). Very soon thereafter he learnt of the proclamation of Philp of Anjou as king of Spain (KRAMER, 1909: 235-38). As soon as William received notification from the regency in Spain of Charles' death he ordered mourning and replied, but he did not acknowledge Philip as king (BATESON, 1937b: 173). Louis XIV sought to justify his betrayal of his treaty obligation, referring to the Emperor's hostility to partition, but his conduct confirmed William's long-held suspicion, that Louis could not be trusted. As early as April 1698, at the start of the partition negotiations William had wondered how any deal with Louis could be relied on given the French king's refusal to be bound by his consort's renunciation of 1659 (GRIMBLOT, 1848: 1, 344-45). William felt personally tricked by Louis and that war was inevitable, but with his army reduced (above), there was little he could do. While many of his English subjects were anxious about the implications of Philip's accession for the balance of power (HISTORICAL MANUSCRIPTS COMMISSION, 1888: 2, 408-9) many others - to William's disgust – including some of his ministers, welcomed Louis's action, believing that the provisions of the Partition Treaty were bad for England and its trade (above) and - echoing arguments made by the French during the partition negotiations – that once in Spain, Philip would forget his French origins and become hispanised, independent of France (KRAMER, 1909: 241-42, 249-50); that many in England's merchant community took this view is suggested by the fact that stock prices rose on the news of Philip's proclamation (BAXTER, 1966: 379). In late December 1700 Louis XIV's ambassador in London, Tallard reported that the nation appeared to accept the will, but warned his master that William might be able to

transform attitudes should France appear to dominate Spain (MCLACHLAN, 1940:, 33) William would do little more at present than to seek guarantees from the French king of both the conservation of the Spanish Monarchy in its entirety and the security of the Dutch republic. William's thinking and conduct continued, as during the partition negotiations, to be influenced by a determination to protect Dutch as well as English interests, and - witness the instructions given the ambassador he sent to Paris, the earl of Manchester, in January 1701 - to act in concert with the Dutch (WICKHAM LEGG, 1925: 7). Pressed by his English subjects to recognise Philip, for fear that a war would ruin England's trade (KRAMER, 1909: 293-94, 295-97), in December 1700 William decided to send an unofficial agent to Madrid (KRAMER, 1909: 304-5), hoping to receive reassurances about the independence of Spain (and Flanders) before Philip reached Spain, and before recognising Philip (KRAMER, 1909: 276-79; MCLACHLAN, 1940: 34); although the man sent, William Aglionby only arrived in Madrid in March 1701 (leaving in July 1701) (HORN, 1932: 128). In the meantime, the Dutch minister in Madrid Francis Schonenberg, was ordered to tell the Spanish regents that if Spain remained independent of France all would be well, but if not William and the Dutch would act to prevent – using the dramatic language which characterised this correspondence - the "enslavement" of Spain and Europe. In late December William dissolved Parliament and called elections for a new Parliament, which would meet in February 1701 (HORWITZ, 1977: 278) and which – according to many observers - would decide for war or peace; for its part, the Jacobite Court remained hopeful of an improvement in its prospects (HISTORICAL MANUSCRIPTS COMMISSION, 1888: 2, 416).

Some continued to recognise the need to oppose the ambitions of Louis XIV to create a Bourbon "Western Monarchy" and argued that England must act to prevent Flanders falling into Louis's hands. and to secure England's Mediterranean, Indies and Levant trade, using English (and Dutch) sea power to secure and deploy against the French king the immense treasure of the mines of Spanish America – echoes of Drake- but saying little about Philip himself (HISTORICAL MANUSCRIPTS COMMISSION, 1888: 2, 417-18). But others were less bellicose, anxious among other things about the cost and resulting tax burden (HISTORICAL MANUSCRIPTS COMMISSION, 1888: 2, 417). These differences of opinion fuelled and were fuelled by a flood of pamphlets

arguing for and against war ((HISTORICAL MANUSCRIPTS COMMISSION, 1888: 2, 419-20); prominent among them was Daniel Defoe's *The Two Great Questions Considered* (LOPEZ CAMPILLO, 2014: 31-54). Already, before the new Parliament met, William was surprised – and encouraged - by an apparent shift in opinion, and greater readiness for war (KRAMER, 1909: 404-05). This was no doubt in response to developments across the Channel including the Spanish regency's instruction to its viceroys and others to obey the orders of Louis XIV, Louis' confirmation (December 1700) of Philip's place in the line of French succession (THOMSON, 1954: 118-19; WOLF, 1970: 620-1), and the French occupation (February 1701) of the "Barrier Fortresses" of Spanish Flanders, with the detention of their Dutch garrisons (BAXTER, 1966: 381). The new English Parliament met in mid-February 1701. Unfortunately for those hoping to focus on the Bourbon threat, the Parliament got bogged down in an attack on William's (mostly Whig) ministers for their role in the conclusion of the Partition Treaties (TREVELYAN, 1930: 139-40; HORWITZ, 1977: 275-304). However, William III was confident that the (Whig) war party would triumph, and that if Louis attacked the Dutch, Parliament would go to their aid; he continued to oppose recognition of Philip as king (KRAMER, 1909: 415-16). He proved right: the Commons asked the king to start negotiations with the Dutch (and other powers) and promised to honour the treaty of 1677 which committed England to defend the Dutch if attacked (TREVELYAN, 1930: 150; BAXTER, 1966: 383). William regretted the Dutch decision to recognise Philip V (in order to secure the release of their detained troops) and himself held out. (KRAMER, 1909: 436-38). At the same time, and in response to worrying intelligence from the French ports of naval armaments, William ordered counter-measures in England (BATESON, 1937b: 236). As relations worsened Tallard was recalled from London in March (BATESON, 1937b: 261). But there were still hopes of preventing war, the French Court apparently seeking to restrain the Jacobite Court (HISTORICAL MANUSCRIPTS COMMISSION, 1888: 2, 422-24). In April, under pressure from Parliament, William wrote to Philip, finally recognising him as king (THOMSON, 1954: 123; FRANCIS, 1966: 96-7). But in May, fearing that the French (and Spaniards) intended to use the effects aboard the returning flota from Spanish America – some of which belonged to William's English subjects - to fund war

against England, William decided to send a force to the Caribbean under admiral Benbow to intercept the flota (BATESON 1937b: 407-9).

Some of William's subjects thought Parliament needed to go much further in confronting the Bourbons – which, as before, really meant Louis XIV rather than Philip V - prompting a wave of Whig petitions to Parliament for stronger measures and for elections for a new Parliament In May 1701 those behind the Kentish Petition (urging war) were punished for seeking to intimidate Parliament (TREVELYAN, 1930: 150-1, 167). This in turn stimulated the production of more petitions and more pamphlets (CLARK, 1934: 195-96; MCLACHLAN, 1940: 43; BAXTER, 1966: 387). The Commons could not ignore the pressure and in June 1701 they urged William to reduce the exorbitant power of France (BAXTER, 1966: 387). These developments meant that William was able to prorogue Parliament in July 1701 – the impeachment of those involved in the Partition Treaties collapsing – and to leave for The Hague, accompanied by John Churchill, earl (later, duke) of Marlborough, to negotiate an alliance which should press Louis XIV (and Philip) to compromise (and avoid war), more confident of English support for any commitments he entered into (BAXTER, 1966: 390). At least one English politician, Sidney Godolphin, anticipated war by the end of that summer (SNYDER, 1975: 1, 5), although some others resented what they saw as the Court's drive to war (HISTORICAL MANUSCRIPTS COMMISSION, 1888: 2, 431).

Unfortunately for those hoping to avoid war, the Spanish Court continued to enact provocative measures harmful to English interests, especially English trade . In August Philip V banned the import of tobacco from the English plantations and was expected to introduce further measures against England's trade with Spain (BATESON, 1937b: 418). That same month, Philip granted the asiento contract to supply the Spanish Indies with African slaves, which the Portuguese had recently surrendered, to the French Guinea Company (LYNN,1999: 269; HANOTIN, 2018: 93-4). Schonenberg feared the total destruction of England's trade in and with Spain, and complete French domination of the Indies trade (COLE, 1733: 415-16; MCLACHLAN, 1940: 41). These developments hastened the conclusion (8 September 1701) at The Hague of the Grand Alliance between England, the Dutch republic and the Emperor (TREVELYAN, 1929: 5-10; TREVELYAN, 1930: 155-57). The preamble explained why the alliance was necessary: the Emperor was the legitimate heir to the Spanish succession, but Louis

XIV had effectively seized the latter, such that France and Spain were now effectively one, threatening not only England's trade everywhere, but also the whole of Europe. The measures taken by those menaced – the allies – created a state of affairs worse than that of "real" war, hence the alliance. To preserve peace, the Emperor sought reasonable satisfaction and the English and Dutch security for their territories and trade. The allies gave France and Spain two months in which to offer satisfaction, otherwise war would follow. In specifying the satisfaction sought the treaty mentioned Naples and Sicily, the Mediterranean islands, and the Tuscan presidios as security for English (and Dutch) trade (in the Mediterranean). Article 6 allowed the English and Dutch to seize and keep what they could in the Spanish Indies for the benefit of their trade (SNYDER, 1975: 1, 20-1). In the event of war, no separate peace would be made, and that peace must include provision for the separation of France and Spain and for the commercial privileges of the English (and Dutch) in Spain and Indies to be restored to what they were at the death of Charles II. The Grand Alliance thus envisaged the possibility, but not the inevitability, of a war of partition of the Spanish Monarchy, leaving Philip in possession of Spain but potentially of little else. It also held out to William's English subjects the prospect of territorial (and commercial) gains across the Atlantic not anticipated hitherto. However, war was contingent on various developments, including Parliamentary approval of the alliance and the commitments it entailed. In November, William, back in England, dissolved Parliament, ordering elections for a new Parliament (HORWITZ, 1977: 297).

The conclusion of the Grand Alliance was followed a month later by the measure which perhaps more than any other united opinion in England in favour of war. The death of James II, on 16 September 1701, and Louis XIV's recognition of his son, the "Old Pretender" as James III of England (James VIII of Scotland), provoked indignation in England (and Scotland) (HORWITZ, 1977: 296) Philip V, too, recognised James (BAUDRILLART and LECESTRE, 1912-16: 9). The French Court sought to justify the proclamation of James as it had that of Philip just ten months earlier, to downplay its significance, and to reassure English opinion (THOMSON, 1954: 125-30; BATESON, 1937b: 424-5)- but without success. Hitherto, trade had been the dominant issue in the English response to Philip V's accession and the measures which followed it; that was no longer the case. Louis' recognition of James III helped William enormously to

convince those in England who were still uncertain. Later that month it was reported from London that "we talk of nothing but war" (HISTORICAL MANUSCRIPTS COMMISSION, 1888: 2, 436). In October 1701, the earl of Manchester was recalled from the French Court without taking formal leave (WICKHAM LEGG, 1925: 5). Later that same month, following reports that the French and Spanish Courts had instructed their governors and commanders in the West Indies not to allow the English (and Dutch) to trade in those parts, and to treat their ships as enemies, admiral Benbow was ordered to protect English shipping, to retaliate and to seize the French warships which it was believed now carried the cargo of the returning Spanish flota (BATESON, 1937b: 431-2) This was tantamount to a declaration of war, war was anticipated, and yet peace prevailed; indeed, the Dutch expressed surprised at the English indulgence of Louis' recognition of James, promising their support if William declared war (BATESON, 1937b: 451-3).

The Parliament which assembled in January 1702 was understandably more bellicose than its predecessor, although some Tory merchants continued to worry that William's committing England to supporting the Dutch against France and Spain (after having recognised Philip as king) would damage England's trade (HOLMES and SPECK, 1967: 91-2). William's initial address to Parliament urged the need for measures against France, the answering address urging him to include in his treaties a provision that no peace would be made with France until Louis XIV made reparation for his recognition of James, the "Old Pretender" (HORWITZ, 1977: 300-1). That same month further instructions were sent to admiral Benbow in the Caribbean and to the governor of Jamaica, founded on reports of hostility on the part of the Spanish colonists towards the French, which they were ordered to exploit if possible; they were to encourage those preferring the house of Austria (even independence) rather than France – as usual, there was no mention of Philip V (BATESON, 1937b: 520-22).

The death of William III in March 1702 and the accession of queen Anne might have been expected to prevent the outbreak of war; the French Court certainly thought so (THOMSON 1954: 132) After all, William's opposition to Louis XIV, dating back to 1672, was in some respects a personal mission, and not necessarily one shared by the new queen. Nor did Anne have the same close personal tie to the Dutch. However, the sense of a real threat posed by a Spain ruled by Louis' grandson was by this time

widespread in England, many continued to believe that England must support the Dutch (SNYDER, 1975: 1, 249-52), while the French Court continued to recognise James VIII, referring to Anne simply as the "princess of Denmark" (SNYDER, 1975: 1, 128). The addresses to the queen on her accession by both houses of Parliament called on her to continue William's efforts to restrain the exorbitant power of France, but without mentioning Philip V or Spain; these latter were implicit but Louis and France remained the overriding concern (BOYER, 1722: 10-11). Pamphlets, too made the case for war, including *Reasons prov'd to be unreasonable: or, an answer to the Reasons against a war with France. Fully demonstrating, that the French King's owning the Prince of Wales for King of England, Scotland, and Ireland is directly contrary to the Treaty of Ryswick* and *Reasons for a war with France and Spain, wherein some late arguments against it are consider'd.* The Secretary of State, the earl of Manchester instructed Methuen in Lisbon to inform the Court of Portugal that William's death did not mean any change in English policy (BATESON, 1937b: 3). A provision was later added to the Grand Alliance that no peace be made which did not recognise queen Anne (TREVELYAN, 1929: 10). War against France and Spain was at last proclaimed in London, on 4 May 1702 (OS) (TREVELYAN, 1930: 214). The following day, intelligence having been received of 2,000 troops being sent from Spain to Mexico, with the new viceroy, ships were ordered to Coruna to intercept and (if possible) destroy the departing convoy, to protect English and Allied shipping, and to attack that of France and Spain (MAHAFFY, 1916: 49).

It was war at last, fifteen months after the death of Charles II and the succession of Philip V. The reasons for war, outlined by queen Anne in a letter sent to the Scottish Parliament a few days after the proclamation, are now familiar to us: the exorbitant power of the French king, threatening the liberties of Europe and his owning the "pretended" Prince of Wales as king, his influencing Spain to do the same, threatening the Protestant religion and the queen's subjects, these had all obliged Anne, in pursuance of the treaty entered into by the late king and the queen's allies (the Grand Alliance), to declare war against France and Spain; the queen took the opportunity to press the continuation of negotiations for the union of England and Scotland(MAHAFFY, 1916: 58). The war was about far more than just trade.

"No Peace Without Spain" (1703-10)

When England finally declared war in May 1702, England had recognised Philip V as king of Spain (above) but – as at end 1700 - was committed to a partition of the Spanish Monarchy, although with the prospect of obtaining (by conquest) some of Spanish America. In May 1702 admiral Benbow (in Jamaica) had hopes that the Spaniards in the Caribbean might declare for the Austrian Habsburgs, although he thought that a member of that family must first be established in Old Spain (MAHAFFY, 1916: 175). Soon thereafter Benbow informed the Governor of Havana that the English monarch was about to have the archduke carried to Spain where he was expected to be received as lawful king without opposition, being assured that nineteen parts of twenty in Spain "languish with impatience for the happy opportunity, having already had a taste of the French yoke and being sensible of the difference betwixt being a province of France…and living under the lenity of the House of Austria" (MAHAFFY, 1916: 174-75). But it was not (yet) official policy in London to secure the entire Monarchy for Charles at the expense of Philip.

In fact an English and Dutch land and sea operation was already under discussion before the declaration of war, under admiral sir George Rooke and the duke of Ormonde. Its objective was the capture of Cadiz, or – should that prove too challenging - Gibraltar, or (on the return journey) Vigo or Coruna. If any places were taken and could be held, Rooke was ordered to leave a garrison and ships there. He was also to detach a squadron of ships for the Caribbean to defend the English islands there and the trade of queen Anne's subjects (MAHAFFY, 1916: 108-10). Rooke and Ormond were further ordered to find (in Cadiz) and send with that force, persons of credit and interest in those countries (Spanish America), and priests, who might bring over to the house of Austria the Spanish governors and indians, "since all we take is for the Emperor and the archduke" (MAHAFFY, 1916: 131). The expedition was late in leaving, ruling out any chance of attempting Gibraltar (MAHAFFY, 1916: 192). But otherwise the prospects seemed good, intelligence reports suggesting that the Spaniards were ready to revolt (MAHAFFY, 1916: 195). Queen Anne intended to send a powerful squadron to the Mediterranean in 1703, building on the possession of Cadiz (MAHAFFY, 1916: 215-16). However, Cadiz was not taken and the behaviour of the English and other troops – attacking and plundering churches - was counter-productive, a gift for Bourbon propagandists seeking to portray the war as one of religion (OWEN, 1938: 71-81). The

Imperial ambassador in London, count Wratislaw complained that the manifesto prepared for distribution by the expedition declared that the allies wished only to free Spaniards from French slavery, but that their conduct at Cadiz would drive the Spaniards into closer alliance with the French (MAHAFFY, 1916: 254-55). The victims of the plundering included the English merchants, George and Thomas Finch, who had long traded to Spain. In a petition to queen Anne of November 1702 they stated that they had been encouraged by the peace of 1697 to send out cargoes of goods to Puerto de Santa Maria, but that informed of the Partition Treaty and Charles II's will, they feared war and sought to wind up their business, and to recover those goods. Unfortunately, their English partner at Puerto de Santa Maria had lodged the goods, which they valued at 25,000 dollars, with a Spaniard, Don Juan del Camino, whose house was among those plundered (MAHAFFY, 1916: 299-303).

But while the expeditionary force did not achieve its primary goal at Cadiz, that setback was compensated by its capture of much of the returning flota at Vigo (KAMEN, 1996: 165-73; KAMEN, 1969: 179-80). Furthermore, this boosted English (allied) diplomacy in Lisbon. In 1701 the Portuguese king had allied with the Bourbon kings of France and Spain. This was not out of any real inclination to those two Courts, rather the opposite. The Portuguese Court - like that of Turin – joined the Bourbons out of fear of the vast neighbouring Bourbon bloc (justifying English and other allies' anxieties about the consequences of Philip V's accession, and indicating the extent to which independent Portugal remained after 1668 anxious about Spain (FRANCIS, 1966: 154). English ministers sought to exploit Portuguese unease, and to draw them into the Grand Alliance, with all the benefits that would bring the Allies, including an anchorage (Lisbon) which would permit English (and Dutch) ships to winter in southern Europe, to enter the Mediterranean early the following campaign (SNYDER, 1975: 1, 141, 145), to intercept French warships passing between Toulon and Brest (FRANCIS, 1966: 182-83), and opening a new front in Spain itself which would relieve the pressure on the Allies elsewhere (MAHAFFY, 1916: 632-33). Partial allied success at Cadiz, and success at Vigo and elsewhere in 1702 aided Allied diplomacy in Lisbon (FRANCIS, 1966: 151-54) where a treaty of alliance was concluded In May 1703 (HORWITZ, 1968: 172-73).

The Portuguese alliance had another important implication in terms of the English response to Philip V's accession in Spain, transforming England's war aims. The

Portuguese king had refused to join the Grand Alliance unless his new allies agreed that the archduke Charles should be declared king of Spain, that they would not make peace until Philip V was removed from Spain, and that he would not declare war until Charles and the promised allied troops appeared in Lisbon (MAHAFFY, 1916: 683-84). Accordingly, on 12 September the Emperor Leopold declared his son Charles (III) of Spain (SNYDER, 1975: 1, 246). Two weeks later, on 28 September 1703 the Imperial ambassador at Rome, count Lamberg, informed admiral sir Cloudesley Shovell at Leghorn of that declaration after which every English ship in Shovell's squadron fired a salute (BOYER, 1722: 85). In December 1703, Charles – en route for Portugal – was received in England by Queen Anne as king of Spain (FRANCIS, 1966: 219-23). Thereafter, until the end of the war English ministers invariably referred to Charles as king – " Charles III"- of Spain, and to Philip as duke of Anjou. In February 1704, the Emperor's envoy in London, count Wratislaw, was received by queen Anne as Charles' envoy (BOYER, 1722: 119), and English diplomats accredited to the Court of Spain resided at that of Charles (HORN, 1932: 128-32). Years later, some English politicians would regret a treaty which had diverted English resources away from a very profitable war in the West Indies and into a theatre (Portugal) which had proved completely unproductive (HMSO, 1904: 1, 155-56). But henceforth, partition was abandoned as an English and allied war aim in favour of "No Peace Without Spain", i.e. Philip's replacement as sovereign of the entire Spanish Monarchy by the archduke, English troops fighting in Spain to that end (BURTON, 1955: 35-62). A bye-product of the alliance with Portugal was the conclusion (December 1703) of the so-called Methuen treaty which shaped trade between England and Portugal for long after the war of succession (FRANCIS, 1966: 184-218).

"No Peace Without Spain" remained the English objective between 1703 and 1710. As queen Anne told Parliament in October 1705, "Nothing can be more evident, than that if the French King continues Master of the Spanish Monarchy, the Balance of Power in Europe is utterly destroy'd, and he will be able, in a short Time, to engross the Trade, and the Wealth of the World" (BOYER, 1722: 209), a view echoed by Marlborough (SNYDER, 1975: 1, 504). In May 1706 Marlborough was optimistic that Spain would declare for Charles (SNYDER, 1975: 1, 537-38). Reflecting that expectation, James Stanhope's instructions as queen Anne's envoy to Charles III in 1706 urged him to secure as many commercial advantages for her subjects as possible. And when

the allies – briefly - occupied Madrid that summer, it seemed as if "No Peace Without Spain" was about to be realised. Hence the disappointment – and annoyance – of English ministers that Charles did not show himself in Madrid at that time. in November Stanhope 1706 was ordered to secure from Charles the asiento. Charles was reluctant to make concessions on Spanish America but his bargaining position vis a vis the ally – England - on which he depended so much following the Bourbon victory at Almansa in 1707. Stanhope was thus able to conclude a trade treaty in July 1707. The treaty not only confirmed (and extended) the English trading privileges detailed in the treaty of 1667, but also allowed the Englih (in a secret article) to send 10 ships annually to trade with the Spanish Caribbean until an Anglo-Spanish trading company could be formed after the war. Stanhope had not obtained the asiento, but in many respects the treaty anticipated the settlement with Philip V of 1713. More important in the present context, the treaty demonstrated that immediately after Almansa English ministers still envisaged a future in which Charles - not Philip V - occupied the Spanish throne (BOYER, 1722: 295-97; WILLIAMS, 1930: 60-1). The Allied conquest of Flanders, Milan, Naples, Sardinia, Ibiza and Menorca between 1706 and 1708 suggested that that view was not misplaced. Stanhope also sought to get Charles III to cede Menorca to England, efforts which would be realised in th pace of 1713 (WILLIAMS, 1930: 79-85; JUAN VIDAL, 2007: 717-56)

Peacemaking 1710-13

A requirement that Philip V surrender of Spain and the Indies was included in the instructions given lord Townshend and Marlborough in the spring of 1709 for their mission to The Hague to agree terms which might be the basis of peace with France and Spain (SNYDER, 1975: 3, 1247). At the same time, queen Anne's ministers planned another expedition to secure Cadiz, in order to facilitate the transfer of Spain to Charles III (SNYDER, 1975: 3, 1261-62, 1287). At the end of May 1709, England/ Britain, the Dutch and the Emperor agreed their preliminary peace terms. Inter alia, Louis must recognise Charles as king of Spain, the Indies and of all the other territories which comprised the Spanish Monarchy , apart from those which were promised to the king of Portugal and the duke of Savoy and as a Dutch barrier in Flanders, he must also recognise queen Anne and make other concessions to England (BOND, 1949: 268-76). In the negotiations which followed Louis XIV accepted the demand that Philip should abandon Spain, but claimed

that he could not force him to comply with, for example, the Allied demand for "cautionary" towns in Spain as guarantee of the cession of the whole Monarchy, and certainly not by the deadline laid down by the Allies zas their condition for agreeing to a ceasefire (BOND, 1949: 285-86) Anticipating the conclusion of peace with France but not with Spain, queen Anne's ministers contemplated a further treaty with the Emperor and the Dutch regarding their individual contributions to driving Philip out (BOND, 1949: 285-87-88), the Governor of the Bank of England insisting (September 1709) that a peace which did not include Spain would be "rotten" (SNYDER, 1975: 3, 1371). Nothing had been concluded by the time of the battle of Malplaquet, another defeat for France but one which was very costly for the Allies, and which encouraged both sides to continue the peace negotiations throughout the winter of 1709-10. In March 1710 the French negotiators repeated an old claim that Louis could not simply deliver up Spain, and that it was "unnatural" to expect him to wage war on his grandson (BOND, 1949: 308-10). They suggested that Philip be offered various territorial inducements to attract him from Spain: the kingdom of Aragon, or Naples or Sicily with Sardinia and the Tuscan presidios (BOND, 1949: 264-66, 310-12, 316-17, 317-19). Godolphin for one was not entirely hostile to this; he thought that a peace in which Philip secured Sicily and Sardinia - a partition of the Monarchy – represented a good deal for queen Anne (and her subjects) who could not rely on the full co-operation in any continuing war for Spain of either the Emperor, or of the Dutch, who had never fully subscribed to "No Peace Without Spain" (SNYDER, 1975: 3, 1453-54). In June the French reduced their demand to just Sicily and Sardinia for Philip, agreeing to help the Allies force Philip to accept this partition after four months, although Louis offerd the Allies a subsidy rather than troops (BOND, 1949: 317-19). But these proposals were rejected by the Allies; the French, long suspected of not negotiating in good faith, broke off the peace talks in July 1710 (BOND, 1949: 330). The lengthy peace negotiations had not brought peace and left Philip in possession in Spain and the Indies. (TREVELYAN, 1932: 422-26; TREVELYAN, 1934: 54-9; VEENENDAAL , 1970: 410-445; PITT, 1970: 446-79; ALBAREDA, 2010: 278-92).

In London, in the spring of 1709 the stock market had risen on expectations of peace, only to fall as those hopes were dashed, rising again in early 1710 when negotiations continued (SNYDER, 1975: 3, 1271, 1437-38). The English public was increasingly tired of

a war, in which England seemed to bear most of the burden – not least in Spain (SCOULLER, 1976-1977) – but in which, despite remarkable successes, final victory – and peace - seemed elusive. English ministers had long been disappointed with Charles's failure to act more vigorously in Spain (SNYDER, 1975: 2, 634-35), but still backed him. The war remained a divisive issue. In 1710, queen Anne dismissed her Whig ministers, those most enthusiastic for "No Peace Without Spain", appointing a largely Tory ministry which in August 1710 – just weeks after the failure of the peace negotiations at Geertruydenberg (above) - opened secret peace talks in London with the French Court, through the Tory (and Jacobite) earl of Jersey (TREVELYAN, 1934B: 100-05). That same autumn the Tories won a General Election. In December, after the (second) Allied evacuation of Marid that summer, but before queen Anne's ministers knew of Stanhope's defeat (and capture) at Brihuega, Jersey informed Torcy that the English government would no longer insist on "No Peace Without Spain", or would only do so as a matter of form (TREVELYAN, 1934: 109). The death some months later, in April 1711, of Charles's childless elder brother, Emperor Joseph, and Charles' succession to that Habsburg inheritance (and election as Holy Roman Emperor), threatened to resurrect the empire of Charles V, menacing the European balance just as had Philip V's succession in Spain. This gave added force to the arguments in favour of the shift in English policy, but the abandonment of "No Peace Without Spain" as a war aim had been decided long before, a policy change which for some – few - of those involved, including Jersey, implied a rapprochement with the Bourbons which might benefit the exiled James III, emphasising again the link between the Spanish and English succession issues.

The secret negotiations between England and France in London produced (October 1711) new peace preliminaries with offers for all of the Allies, which included Louis XIV's recognition of Queen Anne, and the removal of the Old Pretender from France, measures to prevent the union of France and Spain should Philip succeed in France, and a barrier in Flanders for the Dutch. In addition, further secret offers were included for England, notably Philip's cession of Gibraltar and Menorca, of the asiento for 30 years (for an unusually lengthy period because Philip refused an English demand, reminiscent of William III's demands during the Partition Treaty negotiations, for cautionary towns in the Indies to secure their trade), and of a trading station on the river Plate. Louis XIV also offered concessions on his own part in north America, and at Dunkirk (PARKE, 1798: 1, 374-81' SOMERVILLE, 1932: 646-647; TREVELYAN, 1934: 204-7; PITT, 1970: 459-60; GREGG, 1980: 340-

41). The Imperial envoy in London, count Gallas, immediately made public what queen Anne's ministers had communicated to him in confidence, causing a political storm (BOYER, 1722: 520). The Tory majority in the House of Commons ensured its approval of the preliminaries, but the House of Lords passed a motion reaffirming "No Peace Without Spain"; this threat to the government's peace policy obliged queen Anne to create twelve Tory peers, to secure control of the Lords (TREVELYAN, 1934, 216-19; HOLMES, 1960: 223-34), paving the way for the opening of the peace congress at Utrecht in January 1712.

When the congress opened, the disposition of the Spanish crown was still not wholly settled. But deaths in the French royal family in 1711-12, leaving only the infant son (the future Louis XV) of Philip V's older brother, the duke of Burgundy between Philip and the French throne, revived the fears which had helped bring England into the war in 1702. Queen Anne's ministers realised that more must be done to prevent the danger which had loomed in 1700. In March 1712 the English demanded that Philip formally renounce his claim to the French throne, which had been confirmed by Louis XIV in 1700 (above) and not revoked since, only to be told that French "fundamental law" would invalidate this. But the English secretary of State, Henry St John rejected this argument (PARKE, 1798: 32, 227-30; STORRS, 2014: 32-33) and insisted on renunciation, saying Philip must choose: if he preferred his claim to France he should leave Spain immediately. To make abandoning Spain more attractive, queen Anne's ministers suggested that Philip be offered Sicily (still in Philip's possession in 1712) and the territories of the Duke of Savoy, which would become part of France should Philip succeed there. Louis XIV was attracted by these terms, urging Philip to accept them (BAUDRILLART, 1889-1901: 1, 499). While awaiting Philip's response – he was expected to do as his grandfather wished - St John summoned to London the Savoyard representative at Utrecht, count Maffei, in the expectation of being able to inform him of his master's receiving the great prize of Spain and the Indies (PITT, 1970: 464; SYMCOX, 1983: 157-70; GRELL, 2007: 673-90).

The English ministers' wish to do something for the duke of Savoy (apart from securing restoration of the territories occupied by the French, and providing him with an Alpine Barrier against France is noteworthy, not least because queen Anne's ministers had earlier been as critical of the duke as they were of the other Allies. (SNYDER, 1975: 3, 1300-1). But queen Anne was the cousin of the duke's consort, Anne-Marie of Orleans, had spent part of her childhood in her household, and had great affection for her family

(CARUTTI, 1885: 233). Furthermore, the Act of Settlement (above) had set aside the claim to the English/ British crown of the duchess and her children (the next in line of succession after the Old Pretender) in favour of the house of Hanover. Finally, Victor Amadeus's claim to the Spanish succession had been acknowledged – after those of Anjou, Berry and the archduke - in the wills of Philip IV and Charles II.

But Philip, contrary to hopes (and expectation) preferred to keep Spain (BAUDRILLART, 1889-1901: 1, 499). In June 1712, the general peace terms were submitted to Parliament, which was then prorogued until April 1713, after the conclusion of the peace, ensuring that Queen Anne's ministers were not obstructed in their final negotiations by parliamentary interference. The queen (and her ministers) still wanted to do something for Duke of Savoy. The dukes had long sought to secure Milan, but this (and Naples and Sardinia) was now in the hands of the Emperor. Philip was therefore required to cede Sicily to Victor Amadeus. Sicily in the hands of the Duke of Savoy was advantageous to England because, having no fleet of his own as yet, the duke would be dependent on England to defend it, thus ensuring a (vicarious) British presence of sorts in the central Mediterranean to supplement that offered by possession of Gibraltar and Menorca, and further security for England's Mediterranean and Levant trade: William III had expressed a vague interest in Sicily – Messina - during the partition negotiations (GRIMBLOT, 1848: 1, 363-72). Finally, and reflecting the place of the house of Savoy in the wills of both Philip IV and Charles II, the house of Savoy was to succeed in Spain, should the Spanish Bourbon line die out (SYMCOX, 1983: 157-70; STORRS, 2013: 77-79) .

While Queen Anne and her ministers promoted the interests of the Duke of Savoy in their settlement with Philip V, they abandoned those of their Catalan allies. Anne expressed some concern for the Catalans, but she was too easily convinced by Philip (or perhaps by her own ministers) that Philip's promise that the Catalans would in future enjoy the same rights/privileges as his Castilian subjects meant that they would not lose out, although in reality this paved the way for the repressive Nueva Planta. This was one of the aspects of the peace which most rendered the queen's ministers vulnerable to attack inside and outside Parliament in 1713-14 (TREVELYAN, 1934: 247-48; ALBAREDA, 2010: 386-418; CASTELLANO GARCÍA, 2020: 329-63).

Post 1713

The peace of 1713 was unpopular with George I, who succeeded Anne in 1714 and who preferred the Whigs to the Tories, but he did not renew the war against the Bourbons, because the peace was reckoned to have brought some real gains, the country was averse to renewing war on the recent scale, and the new regime might face a Jacobite challenge, as it did in 1715 and 1719, when Philip V backed an abortive Jacobite invasion of Scotland (SZECHI, 2019: 184-88). Instead, England became the champion of the Utrecht settlement (MCKAY, 1971: 264-84). But that peace was resented by Philip V who sought to overturn it (STORRS, 2016b). In consequence it proved difficult for the English to take full advantage of the asiento and permission ship, which were abandoned after 1748 in return for compensation from Spain. Philip's revisionist agenda, and his continued quarrel with the Emperor ensured that England and Spain were at war again briefly between 1718 and 1720, when the English ministers in their efforts to end the "slavery" now supposedly imposed on Spain by Alberoni briefly considered allying again with the Catalans, implicitly challenging Philip's Nueva Planta and - echoes of 1702 - attacking Cadiz (WICKHAM LEGG, 1925: 145-48). That conflict ended with some concessions to Philip which included a vague promise by George I to return Gibraltar, another of Philip's revisionist targets, and which his forces besieged in 1727. However, British opinion had become so attached to Gibraltar since its acquisition in 1704 that Philip and his successors would never recover it (PLANK, 2013: 346-69)

Conclusion

England – the Court in London - would not have entered the War of the Spanish Succession had the Archduke Charles or the Electoral Prince of Bavaria succeeded Charles II. The problem was less Philip himself than what he represented, (French) Bourbon control of Spain and of Spanish Americas, the transformation – invigoration and revival - of an apparently declining Spain, and the threat this posed to England's trade in and with Spain and Spanish America. But trade was not the only issue, as Louis XIV recognised in December 1700 (MCLACHLAN, 1940: 34-5, 45). England's revolution settlement (1688-89) and its Protestant religion also appeared to be menaced by a Bourbon bloc which would overturn the European balance of power. The English reaction was not – at least initially – narrowly insular. William III spoke for more than just England (and Scotland) while many other English subjects, before and after his death,

acknowledged the importance of the Low Countries to England's security. While war seemed likely to many in 1700, and inevitable after it was declared in 1702, it could be avoided and/ or delayed: reasons to go to war did not – and do not - guarantee war. (Later, the War of Jenkins Ear would also be a long time coming). In the war of succession that did eventually happen England's money, its fleet and Marlborough's victories transformed England's position in Europe. England became the arbiter of the peace in 1713. The war transformed England itself, a Union with Scotland being rendered necessary by the war (STORRS, 2008). The war also confirmed Britain as a parliamentary and a "fiscal military" state, although the associated challenges fuelled – as in other combatant states – domestic divisions. Initially, in 1702 England sought a partition of the Spanish Monarchy, but the cost of broadening the anti-Bourbon alliance was a commitment to secure the entire Monarchy for Charles II ("No Peace Without Spain") – England pressing that objective far more than did its allies – until failure in Spain and frustration with Charles, the Austrian Habsburgs and the Allies generally, saw queen Anne's government prefer again partition. It is then that Philip really came into his own as an independent player, opting (against the preference of his grandfather) to keep Spain and the Indies. That Philip retained the Indies reflects the fact that although the English gained the asiento and permission ship, they failed to realise the possibility opened by the Grand Alliance of conquests in Spanish America; that failure was arguably another consequence of "No Peace Without Spain" but also of the fact that it was almost impossible to divert the necessary forces away from Europe to achieve such conquests, although it was considered (SNYDER, 1975: 3, 1346-47, 1348-49) : the war was won (and lost) in Europe. After 1713, English politicians had to come to terms with Philip's revanchism, the implications of his domestic transformation of Spain and the consequences of his second marriage, to Isabel Farnese (ARMSTRONG, 1892). Philip never completely lost his sense of being French and a Bourbon, contradicting those who had asserted that he would become a "good Spaniard", but he did distance himself to a degree from France, in part because of Isabel's influence (Storrs, 2016b). Whether the English ministers regretted, after 1713, leaving Philip in possession of Spain and the Indies is not clear but might repay investigation.

Bibliography

Primary sources

ARMSTRONG, E., (1892). *Elisabeth Farnese, "The Termagant of Spain"*, London: Longman.

BAUDRILLART, A., (1889-1901). *Philippe V et la Cour de France*, 5 vols., Paris: Firmin-Didot.

BAUDRILLART, A. and LECESTRE, L, (1912-16). *Lettres du Duc de Bourgogne au Roi d'Espagne Philippe V et a la Reine,* 2 vols. Paris: Librairie Renouard.

BOYER, A., (1722). *The History of the Life and Reign of Queen Anne*, London: J. Roberts.

CARUTTI, D., (1885). "Relazione sulla Corte d'Inghilterra del Consigliere di Stato Pietro Mellarède, plenipotenziario di Savoia al Congress di Utrecht". *Miscellanea di Storia Italiana*, 2nd ser., Vol. 24, pp. 221-240.

COLE, C., (1733). *Memoirs of Affairs of State…letters ….foreign negotiations from 1697 to….1708*, London: Christian Cole.

GRIMBLOT, P., (1848) *Letters of William III and of their ministers…from the peace of Ryswick to the accession of Philip V of Spain 1697 to 1700*, 2 vols. London: Longman, Brown and Co.

HEADLAM, C., (1910). *Calendar of State Papers America and W indies*, 1701, London, HMSO.

HISPANIA ILLUSTRATA, or the maxims of the Spanish Court…1667 to…1678. (1703) London.

HISTORICAL MANUSCRIPTS COMMISSION, (1888). *Twelfth Report, Appendix, Part Two: Cowper Manuscripts at Melbourne Hall, Derbyshire*, 3 vols., London: HMSO.

HISTORICAL MANUSCRIPTS COMMISSION, (1904). *Calendar of the Manuscripts of the Marquis of Bath at Longleat*, Vol. 1, London: HMSO.

KRAMER, F.J.L., (1909). *Archives ou correspondence inedite de la maison d'Orange-Nassau* (3rd series, 1689-1702, vol 3: 1700-02), Leiden: Sijthoff.

MAHAFFY, R.P., (1916). *Calendar of State Papers Domestic 1702-03*, London: HMSO.

PARKE, G., (Ed.) (1798). *Letters and correspondance, public and private, of the Right Honourable Henry St. John, lord viscount Bolingbroke, during the time he was secretary of state to Queen Anne…..*, 4 Vols., London: G. G. and J. Robinson.

Secundary sources

ALBAREDA, J., (2010). *La guerra de Sucesión de España (1700-1714)*, Barcelona: Critica.

AUER, L., (2018). "A Habsburg Overseas Empire after 1700? Contemporary Austrian Views on the Colonial Dimension of the Spanish Succession". In M. POHLIG and M. SCHAICH (Eds.), *The War of the Spanish Succession* (pp. 431-43). Oxford: University Press.

BATESON, E., (1937a). *Calendar of State Papers Domestic 1699-1700*, London: HMSO.

BATESON, E., (1937b). *Calendar of State Papers Domestic 1700-02*, London: HMSO.

BAXTER, S., (1966) *William III*, London: Longman.

BOND, M.F., (1949). *The Manuscripts of the House of Lords, vol. IX (NS): 1710-1712*, London: HMSO.

BREWER, J., (1989). *The Sinews of Power. War, Money and the English State, 1688-1783*, London: Unwin Hyman.

BURTON, J.F., (1955). "The Supply of Infantry for the War in the Peninsula, 1703-1707". *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research*, Vol. 28, pp 35-62.

CARRASCO GONZÁLEZ, M.G., (1997). 'La colonia británica de Cádiz entre 1650 y 1720'. In A. MESTRE, P. FERNÁNDEZ ALBALADEJO and E. GIMÉNEZ LÓPEZ (Eds.), *Disidencias y exilios en la España moderna. Actas de la IV Reunión Científica de la Asociación Española de Historia Moderna. Alicante. 27-30 de mayo de 1996* (pp. 331-342). Alicante: Universidad de Aliocante.

CASTELLANO GARCÍA, M.A., (2020). "Gran Bretaña y la cuestión catalana; la negociación hispanobritánica durante el final de la guerra de Sucesión española". *Studia historica. Historia moderna*, Vol. 42, Nº 2, 329-6.

EHRMAN, J., (1947-49). "William III and the Emergence of a Mediterranean Naval Policy, 1692-4". *Historical Journal*, Vol. 9, N° 3, pp. 269-92.

FERNÁNDEZ NADAL, C.M., (2009). "La pugna por la soberanía colonial en América: el problema de Jamaica y las relaciones con Inglaterra (1665-1671)". M. C. CORONA MARZOL, I. FRASQUET y C. M. FERNÁNDEZ NADAL (Coords.), *Legitimidad, soberanías, representación: independencias y naciones en Iberoamérica* (pp. 15-40). Castellón: Universitat Jaume I.

FRANCIS, A. D., (1966). *The Methuens and Portugal 1691-1708*, Cambridge: University Press.

GREGG, E., (1980). *Queen Anne*, London: Routledge.

GRELL, C., (2007). "Philippe, prince francais ou rou d'Espagne: le debat sur les renociations". In A. ÁLVAREZ-OSSORIO ALVARINO, B. GARCIA GARCIA and V. LEON (Eds.), *La Perdida de Europa. La Guerra de Sucesion por la Monarquia de Espana* (pp. 673-90). Madrid: Fundacion Carlos de Amberes.

HANOTIN, G., (2018). "Trade and Men of Trade in the Conduct of Louis XIV's Diplomacy". In M. POHLIG and M. SCHAICH (Eds.), *The War of the Spanish Succession* (pp. 85-99). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

HOCHEDLINGER, M., (2003), *Austria's Wars of Emergence 1683-1797*, Harlow: Longman.

HOLMES, G., (1960). "The Commons Division on "No Peace Without Spain, 7 December 1711". *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research*, Vol. 33, N° 88, pp. 223-34.

HOLMES, G., (1967). *British Politics in the Age of Anne*, London: Macmillan.

HORN, D.B., (1932). *British Diplomatic Representatives 1689-1789*, London: Camden Society.

JUAN VIDAL, J., (2007). "La Perdida de Menorca como consecuencia de la Guerra de sucesion a la corona de Espana". In A. ÁLVAREZ-OSSORIO ALVARINO, B. GARCIA GARCIA & V. LEON (Eds.), *La Perdida de Europa. La Guerra de Sucesion por la Monarquia de Espana* (pp. 717-756). Madrid: Fundacion Crlos de Ambers.

KAMEN, H., (1966). "The Destruction of the Spanish Silver Fleet at Vigo in 1702'. *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research*, Vol. 39, N° 100, pp. 165-73.

KAMEN, H, (1969). *The War of Succession in Spain 1700-1715*, London: Weidenfeld.

LOPEZ CAMPILLO, R.M., (2014). "Daniel Defoe, propagandista político al servicio de los intereses comerciales británicos durante la guerra de sucesión española (1702-1714)". In *La guerra de sucesión española y la opinión pública hispano-británica* (pp. 31-54). Madrid: Silex.

LYNN, J.A., (1999). *The Wars of Louis XIV*, Harlow: Longman.

MCKAY, D., (1971). "Bolingbroke, Oxford and the defence of the Utrecht settlement in southern Europe". *English Historical Review*, Vol 86, N°339, pp. 264-84.

MCLACHLAN, J., (1934). "Documents Illustrating Anglo-Spanish Trade between the Commercial Treaty of 1667 and the Commercial Treaty and the Asiento Contract of 1713". *The Cambridge Historical Journal*, Vol. 4, N° 3, pp. 299-311.

MCLACHLAN, J., (1940). *Trade and Peace with Old Spain 1667-1750*, Cambridge: University Press.

OWEN, J.H., (1938). *War at Sea Under Queen Anne, 1702-1708*, Cambridge: University Press.

PITT, H.G., (1970). "The Pacification of Utrecht". In J.S. BROMLEY (Ed.), *New Cambridge Modern History, vol 6: The Rise of Great Britain and Russia 188-1725* (pp. 446-79). Cambridge: University Press.

PLANK, G., (2013). "Making Gibraltar British in the Eighteenth Century". *History*, Vol. 98, pp. 346-369.

ROOSEN, W., (1987). "The Origins of the War of the Spanish Succession". In J. BLACK (Ed.), *The Origins of War in Early Modern Europe* (pp. 151-175). Edinburgh: John Donald.

SANZ CAMAÑES, P., (2021). "Propaganda, discurso bélico y demonización del enemigo. La política de Cromwell hacia España a través de sus discursos en la cámara de los comunes". In C. BORREGUERO BELTRÁN, O. MELGOSA OTER, Á. PEREDA LÓPEZ and A. RETORTILLO ATIENZA (Coords.), *A la sombra de las catedrales: cultura, poder y guerra en la Edad Moderna* (pp. 2073-2092). Burgos: Universidad de Burgos.

SCHWOERER, L.G., (1966). "The Role of King William III in the Standing Army Controversy- 1697-1699". *Journal of British Studies*, Vol. 5, N°2, pp. 74-94.

SCOULLER, R.E., (1976-77). "The Peninsula in the war of the Spanish Succession". *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*, Vol. 54, N° 220, pp. 231-245 and Vol. 55, No. 221, pp. 35-53.

SNYDER, H.L., (1975). *The Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence*, 3 vols., Oxford: University Press.

SOMERVILLE, D.H., (1932). "Shrewsbury and the Peace of Utrecht". *English Historical Review*, Vol. 47, N°188, pp. 646-647.

STECKLEY, G.F., (1980). "The Wine Economy of Tenerife in the Seventeenth Century: Anglo-Spanish Partnership in a Luxury Trade". *Economic History Review*, Vol. 33, N° 3, pp. 335-350.

STEIN, S.J. and STEIN, B.H., (2000). *Silver, Trade and War. Spain and America in the Making of Early Modern Europe*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins.

STORRS, C., (1997). "The Army of Lombardy and the Resilience of Spanish Power in Italy in the Reign of Charles II (1665-1700) (Part One)". *War in History*, Vol. 4, N° 1, pp. 371-397.

STORRS, C., (1999). "Disaster at Darien (1698-1700)? The Persistence of Spanish Imperial Power on the Eve of the Demise of the Spanish Habsburgs". *European History Quarterly*, Vol. 29, N° 1, pp. 5-37.

STORRS, C., (2008). "The Union of 1707 and the War of the Spanish Succession". *Scottish Historical Review*, Vol. LXXXVII, pp. 31-44.

STORRS, C., (2013). "How Wars End: Lord Lexington's Mission to Madrid, 1712-1713". *Cuadernos de Historia Moderna. Anexos*, XII*: 1713. La monarquía de España y los tratados de Utrecht*, pp. 77-99.

STORRS, C., (2014). "La Transformación de Gran Bretaña, 1689-1720". In S. TRUCHUELO GARCÍA and M. TORRES ARCE (Eds.), *Europa en torno a Utrecht* (pp. 21-34). Santander: Editorial Universidad Cantabria.

STORRS, C., (2016a). "Los tratados de reparto, la revolución de la política inglesa y el caso de Saboya". In L. RIBOT and J.M. INURRITEGUI (Eds.), *Europa y los tratados de reparto* (pp. 227-254). Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva.

STORRS, C., (2016b). *The Spanish Resurgence 1713-1748*, New Haven: Yale University Press.

STRADLING, R. A., (1972). "Spanish Conspiracy in England, 1661-1663". *English Historical Review*, Vol. 87, N° 343, pp. 269-286

SYMCOX, G., (1983). *Victor Amadeus II: Absolutism in the Savoyard State 1675-1730*, London: Thames and Hudson.

SZECHI, D., (2019). *The Jacobites. Britain and Europe, 1688-1788*, Manchester: University Press.

THOMSON, M.A., (1954). "Louis XIV and the Origins of the War of the Spanish Succession". *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, Vol. 4, pp. 111-134

THOMSON, M.A., (1961). "Louis XIV and William III, 1689-1697". *English Historical Review*, Vol. 76, N° 298, pp. 37-58

TREVELYAN, G.M., (1929). *Select Documents of the Reign of Queen Anne*, Cambridge: University Press.

TREVELYAN, G.M., (1930). *England under Queen Anne: Blenheim*, London: Macmillan.

TREVELYAN, G.M., (1932). *England under Queen Anne: Ramillies and the Union with Scotland*, London: Macmillan.

TREVELYAN, G.M., (1934a). *England under Queen Anne: The Peace and the Protestant Succession*, London: Macmillan.

TREVELYAN, G.M., (1934b). "The 'Jersey' Period of the negotiations leading to the peace of Utrecht". *English Historical Review*, Vol. 49 N° 103, pp. 100-105.

VEENENDAAL, A. J., (1970). "The war of the Spanish Succession in Europe". In J. S-BROMLEY (Ed.), *New Cambridge Modern History, vol 6: The Rise of Great Britain and Russia 1688-1725* (pp. 410-445). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

WESTERN, J.R., (1972). *Monarchy and Revolution: the English state in the 1680s*, London: Blandford.

WICKHAM LEGG, L.G., (1925). *British Diplomatic Instructions: France 1689-1721*, London: Camden Society.

WOLF, J.B., (1970). *Louis XIV*, London: Panther.